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Introduction 
The decision of the European Union (EU) to start formal accession talks with 
Turkey in October 2005 marked a historic point in relations between the parties.  As a 
candidate for membership, Turkey attained recognition from its European neighbors that 
it belongs in the European club of states – a status sought by Turkish and Ottoman 
governments for almost 150 years.  However, unlike in the case of other accession, 
eventual membership still face certain unknown that might derail the whole exercise – 
e.g., Austrian and French uncertainty of granting Turkey membership, Germany’s 
worries over freedom of movement of labor, and the Greek Cypriots’ desire to use its 
veto card to obtain concessions from the Turks in Cyprus. Despite uncertain future of 
EU-Turkey relations, one thing remains clear.  Without EU membership aspirations, it is 
questionable whether Turkish political elites would have moved so quickly to reform 
Turkey’s political system and bring it closer to those found in liberal representative 
democracies of the EU. Yet, despite these reforms on the economic and political fronts, 
events of recent months surrounding the election of the new president in 2007 
demonstrated the delicate nature of Turkish democracy. Furthermore, series of reports 
published by different think tanks and the European Commission, outlined challenges and 
benefits of Turkey’s membership. In light of these considerations, this paper evaluates the 
effects of EU-accession reforms and membership on consolidation of democracy in 
Turkey, and assesses the benefits of Turkish membership for the EU. 
 
Eastern Enlargement of the EU and Turkey’s Place 
At the Essen meeting of the European Council during December 9–10, 1994, the EU 
leaders agreed to prepare six central and eastern European countries (CEEC: Poland, 
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania) for accession to full 
membership.
1 While the EU made this commitment, it also stated that accession 
negotiations with these countries would not start until after the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference to review the state of the Maastricht Treaty. Since that time, the EU 
proceeded ahead with a complex set of assistance policies aimed at preparing CEEC 
states for membership and increased the number of eligible candidates to 12 (added 
Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovenia).  Road to their membership, 
however, was full of political maneuvering around reports issued by the EU Commission. 
 
These 12 countries were the ones identified at the Luxembourg 1998 summit of the 
European Council in a two-phase enlargement plan. The first phase included Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Poland, and Slovenia. The second phase 
included Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia. Malta reentered the picture 
in February 1999, and at the Helsinki summit in December 1999, the European Council 
invited Turkey to be a candidate but without committing to accession talks until the Turks 
meet the Copenhagen criteria for membership. At the EU summit in Nice (December 4–
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institutional changes that will take place after enlargement.
2  The Nice Treaty initially ran 
into a problem in Ireland when the Irish voters rejected it in a national referendum in 
2001.  After a yearlong intense campaign by the Irish government, the voters revisited the 
Nice Treaty in a new referendum on October 19, 2000 and gave it a 63 percent thumbs 
up.  While accession process moved ahead with 12 candidates, Turkey did not get a green 
light on start of formal membership talks until December 2004 when the EU agreed to 
start such talks on October 3, 2005 if the Commission provided a favorable 
recommendation.  The period between 1999 and 2005 marked intensive political reforms 
in Turkey to satisfy EU’s Copenhagen political criteria. These criteria can be viewed as 
outside-in pressures for political reform in Turkey and provide a good comparison to 
other reform processes in similar countries with growing democratic systems. 
 
Assessing the reasons behind enlargement.   
As stated earlier, when we assess the reasons behind this ambitious enlargement 
plan, it becomes clear that, with the end of the Cold War, the EU and CEECs had no real 
alternative but to reach out to each other. The CEECs needed to achieve market reforms, 
integrate their economies with global financial markets, and build democratic institutions. 
EU membership provides the easiest possible way to achieve these objectives. On the 
other hand, the CEECs represent new market opportunities that would increase the EU’s 
sole power in the new international economic order by making it the largest economic 
bloc. Agenda 2000 further elaborates on these issues by identifying three challenges 
facing the EU at the end of the current century: 
 1.  How to strengthen and reform the EU’s policies so that they can deal with 
enlargement and deliver sustainable growth, higher employment, and improved 
living conditions for Europe’s citizens 
 2.  How to negotiate enlargement while at the same time vigorously preparing all 
applicant countries for the moment of accession 
 3.  How to finance enlargement, the advance preparations and the development of the 
EU’s internal policies
3
The EU citizens generally supported these plans. According to the Eurobarometer 
survey number 56, 51 percent of EU citizens supported eastern enlargement.  The highest 
level of support was in Greece with 74 percent followed by Denmark and Sweden with 
69 percent respectively.  In five countries, the level of support for enlargement was below 
the EU average. These were Belgium – 49 percent, Germany – 47 percent, Austria – 46 
percent, Britain – 41 percent, and France – 39 percent.
4 Moreover, 68 percent believed 
that enlargement would make the EU a more important actor in world affairs and 64 
percent viewed enlargement as contributing to the cultural richness of the EU and more 
peace and security in Europe.
5  However, their view of candidate countries varied 
greatly.  Support was highest for Malta and ranges from 72 percent in Greece to 36 
percent in France. The next highest support was for four other first-wave countries 
(Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, but not for Slovenia). Support for 
Hungary ranged from 65 percent in Denmark and Sweden to 36 percent in France, while 
for Poland support ranged from 70 percent in Denmark to 23 percent in Austria. The 
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presented the lowest support for Cyprus at 32 percent. Support for Turkey was the lowest 
among all of the candidate countries. Only 34 percent of EU citizens were in favor of 
Turkey’s membership, and the support ranged from 44 percent in Ireland to 20 percent in 
Germany.
6  
 
Support for Turkey’s membership in the EU remains problematic today. According to a 
special Eurobarometer on enlargement (no. 255) The majority of Europeans interviewed 
(52%) saw the accession of Turkey as mainly in the interest of the country itself. 20% 
would see a mutual interest to both the EU and Turkey for its entry in the European 
Union.  Moreover, Turkey’s accession generated the most disapproval by respondents at 
48%.
7  Among the member states and candidate countries The Turkish Cypriot 
Community (67%) was most in favor of Turkey’s joining the EU, even more than Turkey 
itself (54%). The strongest opposition of the accession of Turkey was observed in Austria 
(81%), Germany (69%) and in Luxemburg (69%). Cyprus (68%) and Greece (67%) were 
also fairly against Turkey’s membership in the European Union, even though they 
support the accession of countries in general. 
 
EU Accession Requirements and the candidates 
  Membership criteria as outlined in various EU documents are summarized as the 
Copenhagen Criteria. 
 1.  Europeanness: The applicant country has to be a member of the European family 
of states. 
 2.  Political criteria: The political system must be characterized by democracy and the 
rule of law, respect of human rights, and protection of minorities. 
 3.  Economic criteria: The country must have a strong market economy that 
encompasses the free movement of goods, capital, services, and people. 
 4.  Other obligations 
 a.  The aims of political, economic, and monetary union. 
 b.  Adoption of the acquis communautaire, the rights and obligations derived from 
EU treaties, laws, and regulations over the years.
8
Acquis communautaire is one of the main requirements for membership in the EU. The 
requirements are quite specific about what conditions candidate countries must meet prior 
to accession. Furthermore, the EU leaders are quite clearly committed to preparing these 
countries for membership. 
The Turkish Case.  
The case of Turkish application for membership is a complex one and deserves 
special attention because of its significance to the EU’s other interests—the Cyprus 
problem for one, and the future of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). 
Turkey applied for EU membership in 1987, and on May 18, 1989, the European 
Commission concluded that the EU was not ready to enter into accession talks with 
Turkey because the Turkish economy was not as developed as the EU’s, the Turkish 
democracy lacked extensive individual civil and political rights, and unemployment in 
Turkey posed a serious threat to the EU markets.
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problem in Turkey’s case was the ongoing Greek-Turkish conflicts over Cyprus, 
territorial waters, the Aegean airspace, the continental shelf, and the rights of the Greek 
and Turkish minorities in their respective countries. Given the extent of this conflict, 
Greece would veto Turkey’s membership in the EU even if the latter were to meet all the 
conditions for membership. 
 
However, not all was lost after this initial European response. Recognizing Turkey’s 
economic and political significance for the EU following the end of the Cold War, 
European leaders began a series of talks with their Turkish counterparts that eventually 
resulted in a compromise solution that neither shut the door on future membership nor 
granted the Turks immediate accession. The outcome was the customs union agreement 
of 1995 that went into effect on December 31, 1995.
10 This agreement gave the Turks 
closer economic ties with the EU than any other nonmember country at the time, with the 
exception of Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, and opened the Turkish market of 65 
million consumers to EU companies. For the Turks, the customs union symbolized their 
membership in Europe and thus put Turkey on track for membership in the EU. For the 
EU members, however, the customs union was the most Turkey could expect from the 
EU for the near future. 
 
The next crucial event in EU-Turkey relations came at the Luxembourg summit of 
December 1997. At this summit, the EU leaders decided on the list of candidate countries 
for membership in line with the recommendations of the European Commission outlined 
earlier in Agenda 2000. The announcement excluded Turkey as a candidate country. The 
Turkish government reacted harshly on several fronts. First, it announced that it no longer 
viewed the EU as a third-party mediator in Greek-Turkish affairs and the Cyprus 
problem. Second, the Turkish government vetoed European allies’ ESDI plans on agenda 
setting in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Finally, on the economic front 
Turkey decided not to purchase military hardware from EU states. 
 
Relations between the two sides were extremely tense and it was clear that something 
had to be done to improve this situation. Not only was Turkey moving away from the 
EU; several important foreign policy and security matters on NATO’s agenda were 
deadlocked. These included lack of progress on Cyprus, the Aegean, and the future 
reformulation of NATO-ESDI relations. Greek-Turkish relations also reached a low point 
in early 1999 after the capture of the separatist Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan by 
Turkish special forces in Kenya as he was leaving the Greek ambassador’s residence. 
 
The initiative for a possible solution to the EU-Turkish problem came from the 
Clinton administration. These efforts gained added momentum after the devastating 
earthquakes in Turkey in August 1999 and occurring to lesser degree, in Greece, when 
the peoples of the two countries began a series of bilateral goodwill initiatives. The 
governments of Greece and Turkey, led by their respective foreign ministers, seized this 
opportunity and started building cooperation in many technical areas such as tourism and 
drug trafficking. The first sign of improvement came when the Commission 
recommended to the Council that Turkey be included as a formal candidate but without 
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Helsinki in December 1999 followed these recommendations and invited Turkey to join 
the CEEC candidates. After intense diplomatic pressure the EU and Turkey came to an 
agreement, with the understanding that both sides will work in an atmosphere of goodwill 
to settle disputes between them. The lifting of the Greek veto was the most significant 
issue in this compromise. In return, Turkey agreed to the EU’s statement that it would 
adapt to the acquis and work with Greece to resolve disputes between the two countries 
and Cyprus; and the EU agreed to review progress on these fronts by the end of 2004. 
The EU stated that if Greek-Turkish problems were not resolved by the set date, the 
Commission would consider recommending taking the problems to the Hague Court for 
resolution, though this is not a binding statement. 
 
Turkey responded to the EU by presenting its National Program, a detailed report 
on economic and political reform plans, on March 19, 2001.
11  This five hundred-page 
document outlined how Turkey intended to carry out specific reforms to meet the 
requirements of the acquis.  In this document, the Turkish government provided its plans 
for economic, social, and technical reforms to harmonize Turkey’s policies with those of 
the Union. However, the response to EU’s call for political reforms remained vague and 
raised concerns among European political circles.   
 
In reality, the nature of the National Program reflected the delicate balance of the 
coalition government in Ankara at the time.  While Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit 
(Democratic Left Party) and his junior coalition partner Mesut Yılmaz (Motherland 
Party) favored listing concrete reforms with deadlines, the other main coalition partner 
Devlet Bahçeli (Nationalist Action Party) and the powerful military argued in favor of a 
more gradual approach to satisfying political reforms. Another factor that took away the 
limelight from political reforms was the financial crisis of February-March 2001 that led 
to Turkey’s adoption of an IMF sponsored economic program.   
 
At the European Council summit of Göteborg in June 2001, EU leaders noted 
economic and political difficulties facing Turkey.  The Council stressed the importance 
of the economic program agreed between Turkey and the IMF and urged its vigorous 
implementation for economic recovery.  However, the EU leaders explained that in a 
number of areas, such as human rights and treatment of the minorities, Turkey’s National 
Program left much room for improvement.  The Council urged Turkish leaders to take 
concrete measures to implement the priorities in the Accession Partnership as this 
represents the cornerstone of the pre-accession strategy.
12   
 
The Turkish government responded recently in October 2001 in an unanticipated 
move by proposing 37 sweeping amendments to the Constitution.  The National 
Assembly voted to pass 34 amendments that signals Turkey’s commitment to meet 
democratization requirements of EU membership.
13  Despite these reforms, the road to 
membership, however, seemed not to be an easy one for both Turkey and the EU.   
 
Despite sweeping political reforms, EU-Turkish relations once again took a turn for 
the worse with the recommendation of the Commission on enlargement that gave Turkey 
no definitive timetable for starting accession talks.
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2002 accession assessment of the candidates and served as a guideline for the European 
Council summit in Copenhagen in December 2002.  According to the Commission, the 
other 12 mostly ex-communist countries had substantial progress in their reforms efforts 
to warrant membership in the Union.  Ten countries would become members in 2004 and 
two others, Bulgaria and Romania, in 2007.
15  This conclusion of the Commission drew 
criticism form Turkish officials for two reasons.  First, the Turkish parliament had passed 
substantial reforms of the constitution to satisfy the EU’s political acquis standards in 
September 2002 and they went unnoticed by the Europeans.  Furthermore, Turkey’s 
experience with liberal representative democratic system was far longer and richer than 
any of the other CEEC.  Second, the Commission’s position on Cyprus’s membership 
was seen as a pro-Greek policy that ignored Turkey’s and Turkish Cypriots’ treaty rights 
over Cyprus’s membership in international organizations/ institutions.  
 
As stated previously, the final outcome of the 2002 Copenhagen summit was to invite 
ten candidates to join the EU in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and to reassess 
Turkey’s progress in December 2004 with the understanding that if this country satisfies 
the acquis, accession talks would commence without delay. 
 
Following this outcome, Turkey embarked upon intensive and substantial legislative 
reforms to meet the Copenhagen criteria. These EU led reforms aimed to bring Turkish 
democracy up to European standards by eliminating authoritarian aspects of the Turkish 
constitutional and legal system. Te Commission’s subsequent report highlighted 
significance of reforms for Turkey’s democracy: 
 
Political reforms, in line with the priorities in the Accession Partnership, have been introduced by 
means of a series of constitutional and legislative changes adopted over a period of three years (2001-
2004). There have been two major constitutional reforms in 2001 and 2004 and eight legislative 
packages were adopted by Parliament between February 2002 and July 2004. New codes have been 
adopted, including a Civil Code and a Penal Code. Numerous other laws, regulations, decrees and 
circulars outlining the application of these reforms were issued. 
16
 
All these legislative reform packages aimed to bring the Turkish constitutional and 
legal system to the standards of the European democracies. Therefore, it is quite possible 
that getting a date to start the accession negotiations by fulfilling the political 
Copenhagen criterion (which in turn would eventually lead to EU membership) was the 
single most influential factor for the rapid and remarkable growth of democracy in 
Turkey between 2001 and 2004. 
 
Where Does Turkey Stand with the Copenhagen Political Criteria? 
  The political requirements for accession stipulate that any candidate country must 
have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities.”
17  In a previous study, I concluded 
that:  
 
Despite positive developments, Turkey’s prospects for membership still face a difficult road 
ahead.  Reasons are complex and require delicate handling by the officials on both sides.  First, the 
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for complete harmonization of the legal systems and stresses adherence to European human rights 
declaration.  Yet, there is progress being made albeit at snail pace.  The Turkish military and 
conservative politicians fear that separatist groups would use extensive political freedoms to 
endanger the unity of the country.  The two main parties they identify are the Kurds and the 
Islamists.  Nonetheless, membership in the EU will cannot be achieved unless Turkey undertakes 
major political reforms that provide extensive individual civil and political rights to its citizens.  
To their credit, the Turkish leaders are facing these challenges as noted in recent amendments to 
the Constitution.  While these reforms still do not meet the entire spectrum of changes expected by 
the EU, they are nonetheless impressive.  In a matter of two weeks, the Turkish leaders have 
achieved more in democratization than they have in the previous two years.
18
 
The positive developments referred to constitutional amendments that previous 
Turkish governments succeeded in passing through the National Assembly. Gradually, 
the Turks have been amending the 1982 Constitution to rid it of the authoritarian articles 
that restrict individual civil and political rights.  In July 1995, the National Assembly 
passed amendments to 15 articles of the constitution easing the restrictions on individual 
civil and political rights.  Among these, the important changes included: 
 
1.  The right of trade unions to engage in political activity (Arts. 33 & 52). 
2.  The right of civil servants to join trade unions (Art. 53). 
3.  The lowering of the voting age to 18 (Arts. 67 & 68). 
4.  Permitting professional organizations to engage in politics (Art. 135), and 
5.  Permitting university staff and students to engage in politics (Arts. 67 & 
68). 
 
  However, six other amendments were defeated which drew criticism from the EP 
members and human rights groups and pro-democracy politicians in Turkey.  These 
amendments would have made it more difficult for the government to ban strikes, 
allowed strikes by civil servants, and withdrawn the present immunity from persecution 
of former members of the military government of 1980-83.
19  More alarming was that the 
government failed to amend Article 8 of the Law for the Suppression of Terrorism.  Until 
recently when the National Assembly passed sweeping reforms to the Constitution, this 
article made even a verbal support of Kurdish nationalism a crime against the state.  It 
was this law that the State used as basis for punishing the six ex-DEP/HADEP (pro-
Kurdish Democracy Party--closed down in 1994) members of the National Assembly.  
These parliamentarians received long prison sentences.  Reforms of October 2001 eased 
this restriction on Kurdish identity and language but maintained strict ban on activities 
that threatened the country.  In fact, these reforms strengthened guarantees in the field of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and limiting capital punishment.  Furthermore, 
the Turkish National Assembly adopted a new Civil Code in November 2001 and three 
sets of comprehensive reform packages were adopted in February, March, and August 
2002.  Among these reforms, those adopted in August 2002 were far reaching: lifting of 
the death penalty in peace time, the possibility for Radio and TV broadcasting in Kurdish, 
the expanding of freedom of expression and greater freedom for non-Muslim religious 
minorities (particularly in expansion of their property rights).  The National Security 
Council recommended lifting of the state of emergency in Southeastern Turkey.  Other 
areas of substantial improvements in Turkish legal system included: 
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1.  Reform of the prison system, creation of the Monitoring Boards and a new system 
of enforcement judges became operational. 
2.  Reduction in the length of pre-trial detention (police custody). 
3.  Provision for retrial of individuals whose convictions have been found by the 
European Court of Human Rights to be in violation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
4.  Change in Article 159 of the Penal Code meant that the expression of opinion 
without the “intention” of “insulting” public institutions would no longer face 
criminal sanction. 
5.  Changes to Article 312 of the Penal Code and to the Anti-Terror Law, the Press 
Law, the Law on Political Parties and the Law of Associations eased some 
restrictions on freedom of expression, association, the press and broadcasting. 
6.  The new Civil Code provides more gender equality and strengthens guarantees for 
the protection and rights of the child. 
7.  Turkey also ratified the 1969 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination.
20 
 
  The EU response to drastic improvements in Turkey’s constitutional and legal 
system through the above reforms has been “now we need to see implementation 
process.”  Most recently, the EU identified several shortcomings in areas of individual 
rights, continued cases of torture and abuse by the police, continued prosecution of 
writers, journalists, and publishers, corruption in the public sector, and strong influence 
of the military in politics (as demonstrated most recently by the military memorandum of 
April 27, 2007).
21  Given these developments what can be said about the impact of EU’s 
political criteria for membership on consolidation of democracy in Turkey?  This 
question begs clear operationalization of consolidation of democracy before it can be 
tackled. 
 
Criteria for Consolidated Democracy Defined  
   Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan define consolidated democracy in a three dimensions 
political development: behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional: 
  
Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, 
social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve 
their objective by creating a non-democratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention 
to secede from the states.  
 
Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds 
the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern 
collective life in a society such as their and when the support for anti-system alternatives is quite 
small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces. 
 
Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental 
forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to, the 
resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new 
democratic process.
22  
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Specifying and narrowing down the concept of consolidated democracy in three 
dimensions enables the application of this theoretical model into the real world cases.   
 
 B ehavioral dimension is an extremely important criterion for consolidation of 
democracy. No democratic regime can be stable and long lasting when significant actors 
engage in undemocratic behavior. The anti-democratic actors can be considered as 
significant when they are capable of disrupting the stability and the survival of a 
democratic regime. A common example of undemocratic actors are anti-system oriented 
political parties (or other organizations) that are disloyal opponents of the democratic 
regime.   
 
  Most anti-system actors make no secret about their political views and goals. 
Their disapproval of democratic norms and attempts to create an alternative form of 
governance (authoritarian, religious etc) is evident through their ideology or 
programmatic declarations.  One can also identify undemocratic behavior in speeches or 
public statements issued by the elite of anti-system organizations.  Using violence to 
achieve political purposes is an anti-democratic behavior par excellence. A common 
example is the use of violence by nationalist movements that aim separatist goals. 
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), an armed Basque separatist organization in Spain, is a 
well known example. These kinds of separatist organizations are serious obstacles to 
democratic consolidation since they challenge the very legitimacy of a democratic regime 
and employ terrorist methods to achieve political goals.  
 
 Attitudinal  dimension focuses on the values and belief system that citizens hold 
regarding democratic norms. This is very crucial because no democratic regime can be 
considered consolidated when a significant portion of citizens believe that democratic 
norms and procedures are not the best means of governance and regard other un-
democratic alternatives as preferable. Thus, in order for a democratic regime to be 
consolidated there has to be a widespread consensus among the citizens that democracy 
as a type of governance is much more preferable and desirable than other types of 
governance such as authoritarian, religious totalitarian etc. In addition, it is important not 
only to observe the behaviors of anti-system parties but also to asses the support that 
citizens give to these anti-system parties (or to any other anti-democratic organizations). 
In order to decide whether “support for anti-system alternatives is quite small or more or 
less isolated from the pro-democratic forces,” one needs to know the number of citizens 
who give support to the anti-system parties and the degree of support that they give. By 
focusing on attitudes and values rather than behavior, attitudinal dimension explores the 
vital issues of consolidated democracy that behavioral dimension leaves out.  
 
 Constitutional  dimension builds upon the two previous dimensions by 
emphasizing the necessity to respect the rule of law, constitutionalism, and the 
institutional norms and the procedures of the democratic regime. For a democracy to be 
consolidated, the actors in a democratic regime have to “obey the laws, the constitution, 
and mutually accepted norms of political conduct.”
23 Therefore, the actors have to 
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democratic order.  Deviating from this democratic paradigm would mean engaging in 
disloyal behavior to democratic regime.  
 
  However, in analyzing the consolidation of democracy, there are additional key 
factors to consider. First, process of democratic consolidation is neither an inevitable nor 
a linear process. During the last couple of decades, many countries, e.g., CEEC and Latin 
American states, have replaced their totalitarian and authoritarian political systems with 
democratic ones. However, this does not mean that these recently established 
democracies will inevitably march towards to the consolidation of their democratic 
regimes. Gunther, Puhl, and Diamandouros argue that democratic consolidation “is not 
and should not be conceived of as a linear process, moving inexorably towards successful 
completion.  Empirical reality has amply demonstrated in recent years that 
protractedness, stagnation, temporary reversal, and, quite often, deconsolidation are 
equally, if not more likely outcomes.”
 24   Second, even if a democratic regime becomes 
consolidated by fulfilling the criteria of Linz and Stepan, it does not mean that a 
democratic regime will be immune to de-consolidation, regression or even breakdown in 
the future because consolidation of democracy is a never ending process and must be 
constantly constructed and re-constructed.
25 And third, there is no set of universal 
obstacles (valid for every country and valid all the time) that must be resolved in order to 
consolidate a democratic regime. According to Guillermo O’Donnell, countries without a 
consolidated democracy face many different obstacles in their quest for a stable 
democratic system. As O’Donnell writes “The problems are not the same in each country, 
and their relative seriousness in different dimensions shows important variations from 
case to case.”
26  This is an important reminder, especially when one assesses the 
challenges to the consolidation of democracy in a given country. 
  
Assessment of Democratic Consolidation in Turkey 
  According to the Linz and Stepan’s model, Turkish democracy could satisfy the 
behavioral criterion for a consolidated democracy when political parties are system 
oriented (e.g., no significant political party tries to usurp democratic processes to 
undermine democracy for attaining fundamental systemic changes) and political actors 
like the PKK ceases to be a significant actor employing terrorist methods and receiving 
foreign aid in order to secede from the Turkish state. However one looks at the PKK, it is 
s significant factor in this regard. After his capture in 1999, Abdullah Ocalan called for a 
unilateral ceasefire on the part of the PKK. In April 2002, at its 8th Party Congress, the 
PKK changed its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) 
and renounced the use of terrorist methods. One year later, KADEK renamed itself 
Kongra-Gel (KGK). Although the Kurdish separatist group has remained in self-imposed 
unilateral cease-fire since 1999, it did engage in violence periodically in the name of “self 
defense.” In August 2004, the PKK renounced the unilateral ceasefire and started to 
engage in guerilla warfare. During the last few months, there has been a considerable rise 
in separatist terrorist activities. Although the PKK at present is not a significant actor as it 
used to be in the 1990s, terrorist separatist activities are far from being eradicated. As 
long as the PKK is capable of launching attacks on Turkish security forces and civilians 
in the region, it has the potential of disrupting the stability of democracy in Turkey. Yeşilada/”Benefits of Turkey’s EU Membership”    12 
 
Given this, one can conclude that at present Turkish democracy does not completely 
satisfy the behavioral criterion for a consolidated democracy defined by Linz and Stepan. 
 
  On the second dimension of Linz and Stepan’s theoretical model, Turkish 
democracy could not fulfill the attitudinal dimension of consolidated democracy as long 
as any political party with an Islamic fundamentalist agenda (like the Welfare Party) or 
any other party with an anti-democratic agenda (such as authoritarian or totalitarian) 
continued to be a major electoral force in Turkish politics. Such parties would violate a 
fundamental task of political parties in functioning democracies – socializing citizens 
toward system consensus.  Given this, one can argue that Turkey achieved considerable 
progress in fulfilling the attitudinal criterion of consolidated democracy when Necmettin 
Erbakan and his Felicity party, with its anti-democratic and Islamist orientation, received 
only 2.4% of the votes in the 2002 general elections. However, in order to satisfy the 
attitudinal criterion fully, one must also assess whether or not the AKP is loyal to the 
laicist democratic order in Turkey. This is very important since any political party that 
wants to be system-oriented has to abide by the unchangeable laicist characteristic of the 
Turkish Republic. Because AKP has its roots in the anti-system Islamic fundamentalist 
Welfare Party, a significant portion of laicist state elites (military, judiciary, etc.) and the 
populace looks at AKP with suspicion, arguing that AKP is engaging in religious 
dissimulation- Takiye.
27 Thus, compared to Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamist Felicity Party, 
one has to determine if the AKP genuinely believes in a democratic system, or if this 
reformist image of the AKP is nothing more than another takiye.  The AKP claims to be a 
right wing, conservative and moderately religious but also system-oriented party similar 
to the Christian Democrats in Europe. During the last four years in power, although the 
AKP has been committed to Turkey’s EU membership and to the economic market 
reforms, the party elites sporadically tried to enact laws that would favor its religious 
base. For example, the AKP attempted to lower the university entrance examination 
requirements for the graduates of the Preacher and Prayer Leader Schools (Imam Hatip 
Okullari). The AKP also tried to enact a law in the new Penal Code that would have made 
adultery a crime. The AKP’s last anti-laicist attempt was to renew a law that would only 
punish organizers of illegal Koran courses from three, to, twelve moths instead of 
punishing them for three, to, six years. These laws that the AKP tried to pass in order to 
satisfy demands of its Islamist constituents were vehemently opposed by laicist political 
elites, the judiciary, the Turkish military, and secular civil society. The current president 
of Turkey, Necdet Sezer, used his veto power to block their passage on the basis that 
these laws violated the laicist principles of the Republic.
28  
  
  The third dimension of the Linz-Stepan model, constitutional, also shows mixed 
results.  Although Turkey has made extensive legislative reforms, the implementation of 
these reforms remains uneven. These legislative reforms have to be nurtured and 
developed through continuous implementation until it becomes part of the democratic 
routine and takes hold deeply within societal forces. As the EU Commission observed 
“changes to the Turkish political and legal system over the past years are part of a longer 
process and it will take time before the spirit of the reforms is fully reflected in the 
attitudes of executive and judicial bodies, at all levels and throughout the country.”
29 Yeşilada/”Benefits of Turkey’s EU Membership”    13 
 
Given this, continuous and effective implementation of the reforms is necessary for 
Turkey in order to improve the quality and consolidation of democracy.
   
 
  Finally, political parties’ role in consolidation of democracy shed some light on 
the above three attributes.  For sure, among key institutions that play a key role in 
consolidation of democracy in any country are its political parties.  According to Elmer 
Schattschneider and Robert Michels political parties provide a crucial link between elites 
and masses and between the government and public.
30 Following in the path of these 
monumental works, Samuel Eldersveld has argued that functioning democracies need 
parties to fulfill a number of important tasks that include organizing public participation 
in politics, control and recruitment of elites, conflict management, competition 
management, policy innovation, and socializing the public to system consensus.
31 As 
such, parties are central institutions in the survival of the political systems.  
 
  For over a century, political parties have played an important role in the 
development of the Turkish political system.  Parties have been instrumental in 
transforming the Ottoman system, establishment of the modern Turkish republic, 
transition to multiparty representative liberal democracy, and progress towards the 
consolidation of this democracy.  Yet, this process of adaptation has not been as smooth 
and stable, as one would have liked to see.  Periods of political instability and military 
interventions (directly in 1960, 1971, and 1980, and indirectly in 1997 and 2007) have 
raised serious questions about the health of Turkey’s political party system, the nature eof 
civil-military relations, and future of its democratic order.  Among the overriding 
concerns of the secular elites in the country, the rise of religious fundamentalism along 
with organized religious political parties ranks high (see above).    Other political parties 
have their shortcomings as well. The MHP (Nationalist Action Party) promotes ethnic-
based nationalism that threatens Turkey’s heterogeneous make up. Moreover, hardly any 
political party in Turkey is democratically governed.
32  Further institutional reforms 
during the EU accession process would go along distance in improving consolidation of 
democracy in Turkey. 
 
    
The Not-so-Expected Benefits of Turkey’s Membership for the EU 
  The decision of the European Union to expand its membership to the Central and 
East European Countries (CEECs) represents the largest and perhaps the most difficult 
expansion proposal in the Union’s history. The implications of this enlargement are 
significant for the EU in terms of political, economic, and security interests, and for 
future stability of Europe. As EU positions itself to become a global actor in international 
system, its leaders and citizens contemplate future enlargement and implications of such 
enlargement (e.g., Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Turkey).  Recent developments in 
France and Denmark where voters rejected the proposed EU constitution cast doubt over 
further deepening of economic and political integration.  However, a series of reports 
from the Commission (Agenda 2000) state that future enlargement is needed if the EU 
wants to be able to compete economically and politically with other global actors.  If this 
is the case, do European leaders realize that their future global challenger might be Yeşilada/”Benefits of Turkey’s EU Membership”    14 
 
someone other than the US?  In a recent study Yeşilada, Efird and Noordijk examined 
how global power transition is expected to affect EU’s position in global affairs.
33  Based 
on power transition model developed by Organski, Kugler, and Tammen
34  In this study 
Yeşilada, Efird, and Noordijk evaluated how different enlargement scenarios of the EU 
would affect its future competitiveness vis-à-vis the US, China, and India.  A reanalysis 
of the updated data set further reaffirmed earlier findings on this subject. 
 
Table 1 provides the formulation of EU scenarios (composition of member states 
of the EU).  The assumption of future EU enlargement include (1) EU25 remains the 
likely number for foreseeable future, (2) Bulgaria and Romania as of 2007 and Croatia 
and Turkey as of 2015-2020, and (3) a hypothetical super EU that includes the Russian 
Federation as of 2030, though it is rather unlikely that the latter would become a reality. 
 
Table 1.  Different Configuration of Future EU 
 
EU25 EU29 EU29+RUSSIA 
Current   Bulgaria  Bulgaria 
 Croatia  Croatia 
 Romania  Romania 
 Turkey  Turkey 
  Russia 
   
 
With this formulation of future EU enlargement scenarios, we can estimate global 
power transition and assess its implication for the Union. The bubble chart in Figure 1 
represent share of system productivity for major powers on the Y-axis with time shown 
on the X-axis.  The size of each bubbles as represents “Productivity per capita” measured 
in purchasing power parity. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Forecasting GDP Shares and GDP Per Capita for EU25, EU29 and Global Competitors: 
2000-2050 (size of the bubble represents per capita productivity measured in PPP) 
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Results are sobering. Over the next fifty years, the US and the EU economies will 
loose ground against China. No future enlargement plans by the EU could prevent it from 
REMAINING the third ranked player among the giants.  The US will continue to have 
the largest per capita productivity for some time and will grow in relation to the EU.  The 
enlarged EU 25 that includes Turkey would have a comparable per capita productivity to 
the US starting around 2040 and produce a steady increase in its share of the global GDP 
around 2050. In contrast to the EU25 and 29, the US loss of economic ground to China is 
less dramatic.  The US and China will reach parity around 2025-2030, at which point 
China pulls ahead and is projected to become the world’s largest economy. Note however 
that the per capita productivity of China will be far lower than that of the US or the EU 
well beyond 2040. The international system in this century will be dominated for the first 
time in memory by a giant with low productivity.  
Given these projections, does it make sense for the EU to continue accession talks 
with Turkey to bring this country into the Union in 10-20 years?  One important question 
deals with the probability of conflict.  Does the current structure augur war or peace – 
and does the change because of integration reduce or increase such likelihood.  First, 
Figure 2 details results from the power transition perspective of a conflict within the 
European regional hierarchy for the EU-Turkey dyad: 
Figure 2: Forecasting Conflict-Cooperation: EU25-Turkey, 2000-2050 
Similarity 
of Interests
Dissimilar 
Similar 
War 
Integration 
Increasing 
Severity of Conflict 
Increasing 
Intensity of 
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Neutrality 
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  The simulation results indicate no conflict is likely between Turkey and the 
current EU, rather the possibility of further integration extends for the near future.  This 
is consistent with reality. Turkey and the EU already have a customs union agreement 
with increasing bilateral trade and investment between their economies.  Therefore, it is 
highly probably that integration will continue to deepen.  The results in Figure 1 
substantiate the expected positive contribution of Turkey on EU’s future growth within 
the global hierarchy. That result substantiates the Commission’s findings on this subject 
in 2004. 
  The more profound and unexpected finding of this study pertains to regional 
stability in the Middle East and Caucasus region. In an earlier study Yesilada, Efird, and 
Noordijk reported an increasing probability of conflict between Iran and Turkey in the 
Caucasus region as their political capacity increased.
35 At the same time, they reported 
that the probability of conflict with Russia declined.  When this regional hierarchy is re-
examined, the future relations between these three regional powers show important 
results for regional stability.  Figure 3 shows regional power transition in this region 
during 2000-2050. 
 
GDP Share and Per Capita GDP Between Iran, Israel, Russia, and Turkey: 2000-2050
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Russia is at the top of the hierarchy today followed by Turkey and Iran with equal 
capabilities. However, over time Iran will move slightly ahead of Turkey over time as 
Russia’s share declines.  These three countries are expected to reach close parity starting 
in the 2030s. The patter is consistent with a uniform hierarchy suggesting if these parties 
are mutually dissatisfied a rising probability of conflict between the defender and 
challenger(s). Thus, in this region unless the status quo is strongly supported, we 
anticipated increased tensions and the resulting potential confrontations that would be 
severe.  
 
Serious implications for the regional hierarchy follow from these evaluations. The 
most alarming findings pertain to relations between Iran and Turkey. As Figure 4 shows 
these countries, power capabilities are converging and increasing the probability of 
conflict starting around 2010 and that the anticipated outcome is a steady and sharp 
increase in the likelihood of severe war. Thus, if their interests become more dissimilar, 
Iran’s challenge of Turkey in the region is likely to be in the form of military 
confrontation.  This scenario is quite likely given Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and 
its dissatisfaction with Turkey’s influence in Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and Georgia.  The 
two are also in a state of “cautious” competition over the future political status of Iraq. 
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Figure 4. Forecasting Conflict-Cooperation: Iran-Turkey, 2000-2050
 
 
 
 
  The unexpected finding pertains to Turkey’s membership in the EU and how that 
affects the future Iran-Turkey dyad.  Unlike the global pattern that cannot be altered by Yeşilada/”Benefits of Turkey’s EU Membership”    18 
 
EU enlargement, interactions in the Middle East that have a doomsday scenario for Iran 
and Turkey can be altered. Turkey’s accession into the EU would dramatically stabilize 
the region.  When Turkey is included in the EU parity between Iran and Turkey 
disappears as shown in Figures 5 and 6. With the addition of Turkey, the EU29 
dominates power in the northern Middle East region. Given such changes in structures, 
Iran is highly unlikely to challenge Turkey that is now an EU member. Thus, one 
outcome of Turkey’s membership in the EU would be guarantee of stability in the Middle 
East – at least as far as competition between Iran and Turkey is concerned. 
 
 
Figure 5: GDP Shares and GDP Per Capita Between EU29 and Iran: 2000 - 2050 
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Year
P
o
w
e
r
 
S
h
a
r
e
 
(
%
s
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
G
D
P
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
D
y
a
d
)
EU29
IRAN
 
Figure 6: Forecasting Conflict-Cooperation: EU29-Iran, 2000-2050 
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Conclusions and Prospects 
  This paper provided an analysis of political reforms in Turkey as a function of its 
quest for membership in the EU.  While political reforms have been ongoing since 
transition to civilian rule in 1983, their speed and magnitude, coincide with push to attain 
the customs union, candidacy for membership, and formal start of accession talks with 
the EU.  While the scope of reforms has been quite extensive, it is still too early to 
conclude that democratic political system has been consolidated in Turkey.  Based on the 
three criteria of Linz and Stepan, it would be pre-mature to state that Turkey at present is 
a fully consolidated democracy. The PKK’s continuing terrorist activities, As the largest 
political party in the National Assembly, the AKP’s ambiguity towards the laicist 
establishment and the ineffective implementation of the recent democratic reforms hinder 
Turkey to be considered a fully consolidated democracy. Achieving a fully consolidated 
democracy will largely depend on how Turkey resolves three challenges it faces: Kurdish 
separatism, Islamic fundamentalism, and implementation of democratic reforms found in 
EU reform packages. From the 1999 Helsinki summit to 2005, Turkey had to fulfill the 
political Copenhagen criteria in order to start the accession talks with the EU. From now 
on, Turkey will be expected to satisfy the other parts of the Copenhagen criteria in the 
hope of becoming a member state of the EU and implement the political reforms prior to 
accession.  
  
  The EU accession represents a significant catalyst for achieving the above goals. 
However, at the same time, inconsistency of EU member states over Turkey’s place in 
the Union could also work in opposite direction and undermine the reform process in 
Turkey.  Anti-reformist and anti-EU forces could capitalize on European leaders’ mixed 
signals and attempt to stop or even reverse democratization in Turkey.  That would be a 
tragic outcome since EU membership aspiration has been a much-needed catalyst for 
democratic development in other central and east European countries.  Would Turkey be 
the one to prove this trend otherwise? It is in the hands of the Turkish political, business, 
and bureaucratic elites along with laicist forces (including its citizens) to move forward 
and secure consolidation of democracy with or without the EU.  The EU served its 
function in providing the much needed external (outside-in) pressure that aided the 
domestic forces of reform to carry out the extensive reforms.  And even if the EU turns 
its back on Turkey, the Turks will be in a much stronger and powerful position in the 
world with a representative liberal democratic system and a stable market economy.  
Failure to implement the reforms would mean turning away from Europe and joining the 
list of unstable Third World countries.  That would be a tragedy since this path was not 
what the founder of the republic had envisioned for Turkey. 
 
  As for the EU, findings show some important policy implications. In the context 
of global power transition, the economic future of the EU, is not very promising. 
Regardless of its enlargement plans, the EU will fall behind the others giants (China, US, 
and India) becoming the third largest economy.  Part of the expected decline in its GDP 
share could be offset by adding Turkey. Contrary to current public opinion in the EU, it is 
only after Turkey’s accession that EU’s economic decline levels off and starts to increase 
in its projected per capita productivity. This is one such “not-so-expected” outcome of Yeşilada/”Benefits of Turkey’s EU Membership”    20 
 
Turkey’s EU membership.  The other such result pertains to how this membership could 
stabilize the volatile northern Middle East/Caucasus region. 
 
  At present, Russia’s dominance in northern Middle East will decline while Iran 
and Turkey will appear to be the regional challengers.  At the same time, there exists 
parity between Iran and Turkey with the former slightly moving ahead in the next 40 
years.  This dyadic relationship between Iran and Turkey is one of high probability of 
conflict that intensify very quickly with time. These two countries are engaged in intense 
competition for influence in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Iraq. Moreover, they 
represent two polar opposite political systems of the region – Iran is a Shi’a theocracy 
while Turkey is a Western style secular democracy. With Iran pursuit of nuclear 
weapons, this dyad is likely to become more conflictual before Iran establishes clear 
superiority. However, findings show that Turkey’s membership in the EU would stabilize 
the volatile Middle East by removing Iran’s growing challenge in the region.  With 
Turkey in the EU, parity between Iran and Turkey disappears and Iran could no longer 
project hostility against the later. If for no other reason, Turkey’s membership in the EU 
should be encouraged by leaders of the Transatlantic Alliance to stabilize this volatile 
region. 
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